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Note
Double Crossed: Why the Newspaper/Broadcast
Cross-Ownership Ban Remains Necessary
in the Public Interest
Daniel C. Moore*
In the weeks leading up to the 2000 presidential election,
the editorial staff of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel was in a
quandary.' Who would they endorse for President? The major-
ity of the staff favored Democratic candidate Al Gore, but oth-
ers favored George W. Bush, the candidate favored by theS 2
newspaper's parent corporation. Four years earlier, the Jour-
nal Sentinel had endorsed Republican Bob Dole, although a
majority of the staff favored then-incumbent President Bill
Clinton.3 In 2000, after much debate, the staff reached a com-
promise, deciding to endorse neither candidate.4 Why would a
newspaper's editorial staff, twice in a period of four years,
choose not to endorse the candidate favored by the majority of
its members, or, more perplexing still, endorse the opposing
candidate in a presidential campaign?
One explanation is that the parent corporation, either di-
rectly or through subtle pressure, was exerting influence on the
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1997,
Princeton University. The author would like to thank the Law Review edito-
rial board and staff, in particular Lauren Hancock and Adam van Alstyne.
1. See David Pritchard, A Tale of Three Cities: "Diverse and Antagonistic"
Information in Situations of Local Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership, 54
FED. COMM. L.J. 31, 47 (2001) (describing the difficulties that the newspaper's
editorial staff had in coming to a decision about which candidate to endorse).
2. See id. (citing a personal communication from an editorial writer for
the newspaper who requested anonymity). The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel is
owned by Journal Communications, Inc., a company that also owns television
stations in Wisconsin, Michigan, Nevada, and California, and thirty-four radio
stations in markets nationwide. See id. at 46. For a detailed list of the com-
pany's Milwaukee holdings, see infra note 8.
3. Pritchard, supra note 1, at 47.
4. Id.
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editorial process. 5 In fact, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) concedes that media ownership often influences
viewpoint, especially when the parent corporation's interests
are involved. 6 Despite this correlation, the FCC considers such
instances to be isolated aberrations that do not reflect the kind
of "uniform bias" that would warrant serious concern.7 But
what happens when the same parent corporation also owns a
local television station, two local radio stations, and more than
twenty weekly newspapers in the surrounding suburbs?8 When
5. But see id. at 49 (concluding that the Journal Sentinel's ownership did
not have a significant influence on its viewpoint in that instance, because the
choice not to endorse Gore did not prevent the newspaper from asserting a
generally pro-Gore point of view in its news articles, staff columns, and other
staff-selected materials). Despite the results of the study, Pritchard has ac-
knowledged other instances where Journal Communications used its media
holdings to forward its own political objectives. See Street Sweep (CNNfn tele-
vision broadcast, June 1, 2003) (providing comments of David Pritchard re-
garding uniformly slanted news coverage by Journal Communication's news-
paper, television, and radio properties regarding a proposal to spend tax
dollars on a stadium plan that was favored by the parent corporation),
available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0306/01/sun.12.html (last
visited Apr. 25, 2004). For a discussion of the many ways ownership can influ-
ence editorial viewpoint in the news media, see generally DEAN ALGER,
MEGAMEDIA: How GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS MEDIA, DISTORT
COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY (1998).
6. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Sta-
tions and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Broadcast Stations and News-
papers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets,
and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,314 (Aug. 5, 2003)
stayed pending judicial review by Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-
3388, 2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (per curiam) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. pt. 73.3555(c)) [hereinafter 2003 Ownership Rules] (acknowledging
evidence that ownership influences viewpoint, without establishing the precise
degree of such influence); see also Bill Moyers, Keynote Address to the Na-
tional Conference on Media Reform (Nov. 8, 2003) (discussing the reluctance of
news organizations to report on the efforts of their parent corporations to
lobby the FCC for repeal of the cross-ownership ban), at http:l!
www.commondreams.org/views03/1112-10.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). For
additional examples of news organizations refusing to cover stories implicating
the interests of their parent corporations, see infra note 88.
7. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314 (finding that anec-
dotal evidence of ownership influencing viewpoint is insufficient to justify a
"blanket prohibition" on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership).
8. In addition to the Journal Sentinel, which is the only daily newspaper
in the Milwaukee area, Journal Communications owns WTMJ-TV, a highly
rated Milwaukee television station; WTMJ-AM, a local conservative talk radio
station; WKTI-FM, a contemporary music station; and more than twenty
weekly newspapers in the Milwaukee suburbs, helping to make Milwaukee
one of the most concentrated media markets in America. See Pritchard, supra
note 1, at 46; see also Street Sweep, supra note 5 ("There arguably is no other
city where a single company has such a stranglehold on news and public af-
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does ownership's influence cease to be an aberration and begin
to pose a serious threat to democracy?
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel is owned by Journal
Communications, one of only a handful of media companies
that own daily newspapers, broadcast television stations, and
radio stations in the same markets. These companies obtained
grandfather status prior to the 1975 newspaper/broadcast
cross-ownership ban, and are currently the exception to the
rule.9 Soon that may no longer be the case. In June 2003, after
a perfunctory public comment period," the FCC voted to repeal
or modify a series of media ownership restrictions that had
been in place since the 1970s. 11 Among these restrictions was
the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban.12 The new Cross
Media Ownership Rule, by permitting newspaper and broad-
cast cross-ownership in most major markets, promises to con-
tinue a disturbing trend toward concentration of mass media
ownership in America."
fairs content as Milwaukee.") (comments of David Pritchard). Journal Com-
munications also owns Norlight Telecommunications, one of the largest tele-
com networks in the Midwest, with clients such as AT&T and the State of
Wisconsin. Robert N. Wold, Consolidation and Convergence Among Uplinkers,
VIA SATELLITE, Aug. 10, 2001, at 8. In 1997, the State of Wisconsin awarded
Norlight a five-year contract worth an estimated $12 million per year. John
Welsh, Fiber Optic Line a Link to Future, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 1997, at 1.
9. See Pritchard, supra note 1, at 33.
10. While the FCC received close to three-quarters of a million public
comments on the proposed rules changes, comments "almost unanimous in
opposition" to the changes, the FCC held only one official public hearing before
a final vote. 149 CONG. REC. S11,503 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Feingold). Feingold went on to note, "This is more than carelessness or
bureaucratic inertia. This was simple disdain for the public in whose interest
the FCC by statute is required to act." Id. At a later point in the debate, Sena-
tor Tom Daschle, criticized FCC Chairman Powell noting that his "'field' hear-
ing was held 90 miles from Washington, and much of his invited testimony
came from industry representatives, many of whom, in fact live inside the
Beltway." Id. at S11,506 (statement of Sen. Daschle).
11. See Frank Ahrens, Panel Fires Shot Across FCC's Bow: Stevens
Amendment Maintains Cap on TV Networks' Size, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003,
at E5.
12. Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Televi-
sion Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975), amended upon reconsidera-
tion by 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636
(1976)) (repealed 2003) [hereinafter 1975 Ownership Rules].
13. There are approximately 1800 daily newspapers, 11,000 magazines,
11,000 radio stations, 2000 televisions stations, and 3000 book publishers in
North America. In 1984, 50 companies owned a controlling interest in the
properties listed above. By 1987 that number was 26. As of 1996 the number
had shrunk to 10, and as of 2002 only six companies owned a controlling inter-
2004] 1699
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The FCC claims new media technologies have created a
competitive media environment where restrictions on owner-
ship are no longer necessary to protect the public interest. 14
Where the deregulatory environment fails to provide adequate
structural safeguards against competitive abuses by media
owners, the FCC claims antitrust law will provide a meaningful
restraint on excessive media concentration. 15 This Note argues
that the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban should be
retained, as the only effective means to safeguard the public's
First Amendment interest in a robust and uncensored market-
place of ideas, and to prevent antidemocratic abuses by mass
media conglomerates. 6  By relaxing restrictions on cross-
ownership, the FCC leaves noneconomic values such as view-
point diversity and localism at the mercy of the open market
and the antitrust laws, thereby abdicating its statutory respon-
sibility to protect the public interest.17
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR CROSS-OWNERSHIP REGULATION
The restrictions on media cross-ownership enacted in the
1970s have their roots in the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment doctrine of the marketplace of ideas and the goal of "the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources."' 8 This section analyzes the constitutional
justifications for the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban
by examining Supreme Court case law, beginning with Associ-
est in the media listed above. See Politics and Economy: Massive Media, NOW:
WITH BILL MoYERS, at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/media.html (last
visited Apr. 25, 2004).
14. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,293 (discussing the im-
pact of the Internet on the availability of news and information sources); see
also infra Parts II.B-C (examining the FCC's justifications for the new cross-
ownership rule).
15. See infra Part IV; see also 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at
46,313 (suggesting that the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission, as well as state attorneys general and private parties, may bring
antitrust actions to protect competition in the advertising markets in the ab-
sence of restrictions on cross-ownership). For a discussion of the new relevance
of antitrust law in the aftermath of deregulation of radio ownership by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, see C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration:
Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 870 (2002) ("[T]he Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice has been the remaining, although
weaker, source of restrictions on the recent consolidating trends in radio.").
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
1700 [Vol 88:1697
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ated Press in 1945 and culminating with the Court's upholding
of the cross-ownership ban in 1978's National Citizens Commit-
tee for Broadcasting.
A. ASSOCIATED PRESS
In 1945 the Supreme Court upheld the application of the
Sherman Act to anticompetitive behavior by a news wire ser-
vice in Associated Press v. United States.9 At issue in the case
were private restraints in the Associated Press's (AP) bylaws
that restricted access to AP news to member newspapers.2 1 Jus-
tice Black's majority opinion established a goal to guide future
applications of the First Amendment to the press and the me-
dia in general: "That Amendment rests on the assumption that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the pub-
lic, that a free press is a condition of a free society."
21
The opinion began by discussing competition within the
newspaper industry, finding the AP's bylaws to be a "contrac-
tual restraint of interstate trade,"22 without engaging in the
kind of detailed market analysis typical of an antitrust case.23
Justice Black rejected the AP's argument that it deserved First
Amendment immunity from antitrust enforcement by virtue of
its role as a news provider.24 Black unequivocally announced
the government's right to intervene structurally when private
interests threaten the free flow of information necessary for a
democratic system of government: "The First Amendment, far
from providing an argument against application of the
Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary."25
19. 326 U.S. 1, 23 (1945).
20. See id. at 4; see also Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust
and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 262 (2001) (describing
the fact situation and the government's case in Associated Press).
21. See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added).
22. See id. at 18-19 (comparing the restraint of trade in information cre-
ated by the AP bylaws to restraints of trade in other industries that were held
unlawful by the Court).
23. See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 20, at 262-63 (discussing the Court's
atypical antitrust analysis in relation to the First Amendment and the mar-
ketplace of ideas); see also Baker, supra note 15, at 871 ("Historically, media-
specific policy concerns related primarily to the democratic or pluralist struc-
ture of participation in the communications order-the interest that Justice
Black so famously endorsed in Associated Press." (citation omitted)).
24. See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 19-20.
25. Id. at 20. Justice Black argued that the First Amendment was in fact
a powerful justification for such antitrust enforcement by the government. See
20041 1701
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter emphasized
the unique relationship of the press to the public interest, and
the corresponding insufficiency of a purely economic analysis in
determining the scope of permissible government intervention:
A free press is indispensable to the workings of our democratic soci-
ety. The business of the press ... is the promotion of truth regarding
public matters by furnishing the basis for an understanding of them.
Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts or potatoes. And
so, the incidence of restraints upon the promotion of truth through
denial of access to the basis for understanding calls into play consid-
erations very different from comparable restraints in a cooperative
enterprise having merely a commercial aspect.' 6
According to Frankfurter, the unique factors that differentiate
the press from "ordinary commodities" implicate public policy
concerns that go beyond formulaic analyses of economic compe-
tition to touch on the very foundations of democratic govern-
ment.27
The commitment to "diverse and antagonistic" sources of
information announced in Associated Press has been repeatedly
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the context of print media,28
and has been applied to justify administrative regulation of
more modern means of communication, such as broadcast and
cable television.29 In the 1970s, when the FCC first enacted
regulations banning cross-ownership of newspapers and broad-
cast television stations, it relied on Justice Black's language
from Associated Press to ground the regulations solidly in First
Amendment concerns. According to the FCC, the goal of fos-
id. ("It would be strange indeed however if the grave concern for freedom of
the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as
a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom.").
26. Id. at 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. Justice Frankfurter echoed Justice Black's language from the majority
opinion, describing the goal of the First Amendment as fostering the "dissemi-
nation of news from as many different sources, and with as many different
facets and colors as is possible." Id.
28. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976); Citizen Publ'g Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
29. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997); FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978); Red Lion Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also Comments from Consumers Union et
al., In re Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers Before the
FCC (Dec. 3, 2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's applications of the First
Amendment principles announced in Associated Press to other means of com-
munication, such as broadcast and cable television), http:ll
www.mediaaccess.org/filings/consumers-union-et-al-nbcocomments.pdf.
30. 1975 Ownership Rules, supra note 12, at 1048; see also Nat'l Citizens
1702 [Vol 88:1697
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tering the "widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources" was an essential principle in
defining the public interest in diversification of media owner-
.31
ship.
B. NATIONAL CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR BROADCASTING
In 1975 the FCC passed administrative regulations ban-
ning joint ownership of newspapers and broadcast television
stations in the same geographic markets, and ordering divesti-
ture of certain "egregious" combinations already in existence.32
The cross-ownership bans were enacted with the purpose of
"promoting competition among the mass media involved, and
maximizing diversification of service sources and viewpoints. 33
While the FCC acknowledged studies concerning the effects of
cross-ownership on competition were inconclusive, and there
was no direct evidence of competitive abuses by existing cross-
media owners, the FCC found the diversification rationale suf-
ficient to justify the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban
in the absence of persuasive countervailing interests.34
In 1978 the Supreme Court upheld the cross-ownership
ban in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting.35
Despite the "inconclusiveness" of the evidence in the record, the
Court held that the regulations were a reasonable means of
achieving the public interest goal of diversification of media
ownership, and therefore within the FCC's regulatory author-
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 785 (discussing the FCC's prospective ban on
cross-ownership as "grounded primarily in First Amendment concerns").
31. See 1975 Ownership Rules, supra note 12, at 1048 (quoting Associated
Press, 326 U.S. at 20); see also CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN
BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ANOTHER LOOK 80
(2000) ("Virtually all Commission policies intended to serve the public interest
were also originally intended to increase diversification of programming.").
32. See Baker, supra note 15, at 862 (citing 1975 Ownership Rules, supra
note 12).
33. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 784. The Supreme Court
also acknowledged the objective of "preventing undue concentration of eco-
nomic power" as an additional benefit of diversification of mass media owner-
ship. See id. at 780.
34. See id. at 786 ("The prospective rules were justified... by reference to
the Commission's policy of promoting diversification of ownership: Increases in
diversity of ownership would possibly result in enhanced diversity of view-
points, and, given the absence of persuasive countervailing considerations,
'even a small gain in diversity' was 'worth pursuing" (quoting 1975 Ownership
Rules, supra note 12, at 1076, 1080 n.30)).
35. 436 U.S. 775, 792 (1978) (upholding a prospective cross-ownership
2004] 1703
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ity3 6 The Court explicitly accepted the FCC's argument that a
rational connection existed between diversity of ownership and
diversity of viewpoints: "[I]t is unrealistic to expect true diver-
sity from a commonly owned station-newspaper combination.
The divergency of their viewpoints cannot be expected to be the
same as if they were antagonistically run."
37
The rationale put forth by the FCC, and accepted by the
Supreme Court in National Citizens Committee for Broadcast-
ing, was that an increase in independent media voices through
enforced diversification of ownership was both a reasonable
regulatory objective and the primary impetus for the cross-
ownership ban.38 Three decades after Associated Press, the First
Amendment goal of maximizing viewpoint diversity continued
to justify and inspire structural regulation of the media 39 It
was not until the early 1980s that the FCC began to reconsider
its presumption against concentration in favor of a "new un-
bounded ... faith in the market,"' ° and dispersal of ownership
for its own sake ceased to be considered a legitimate policy
objective.4'
36. See id. at 796 (citing United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192 (1956), and National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943), to establish the Commission's authority to promote diversification of
ownership through reasonable regulations).
37. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 797 (quoting 1975 Own-
ership Rules, supra note 12, at 1079-80); see also id. at 785 ( "[O]wnership car-
ries with it the power to select, to edit, to choose the methods, manners and
emphasis of presentation." (quoting 1975 Ownership Rules, supra note 12, at
1050)). But see Jerome A. Barron, Commentary, Globalism and National Me-
dia Policies in the United States and Canada: A Critique of Edwin Baker's
Media, Markets and Democracy, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 971, 987 (2002) ("The
cross-ownership rule reflects a certain leap of First Amendment faith, based
on underlying notions that a larger number of smaller and independently
owned media in a community are more likely to yield diverse and original
voices.").
38. See 1975 Ownership Rules, supra note 12, at 1079.
It is clear to us that the idea of diversity of viewpoints from antago-
nistic sources is at the heart of the Commission's licensing responsi-
bility. If our democratic society is to function, nothing can be more
important than insuring that there is a free flow of information from
as many divergent sources as possible.
Id.
39. See Baker, supra note 15, at 867 ("[D]ispersal itself, not competition or
similar concerns of an efficiency oriented antitrust policy or even audience
choice, was clearly central to FCC policy.").
40. Id. at 870.
41. See id. at 869-70 (describing the FCC's changing policy in the 1980s
toward eliminating restraints on concentration, and asserting that the
changes were brought about by a new faith in the market, evolving theories of
1704
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II. MODIFICATIONS TO THE NEWSPAPER/BROADCAST
CROSS-OWNERSHIP RULE
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the FCC began to disfa-
vor traditional structural regulation of the media, but resis-
tance from Congress and the courts prevented massive over-
haul of the regulatory framework. 2 The 1980s and 1990s saw
increased concentration of media ownership, attributable to
FCC rule changes and trends in antitrust policy. 4 3 Only in 1996,
when the Telecommunications Act4" passed, did the FCC re-
ceive a statutory mandate to consider repealing all remaining
media ownership restrictions, including the newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership ban.45
A. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
In addition to completely deregulating national ownership
of radio stations and increasing the proportion of the national
television audience a single owner could reach, 6 the Telecom-
competition and substitutability, and an increasing willingness to cave in to
corporate interests). Despite this trend, the FCC continues to occasionally as-
sert that diversity of media ownership promotes "competition within the mar-
ketplace of ideas." See id. at 870 n.163. ("[T]oday this diversity concern is al-
most an afterthought, much less likely than previously to be the determinative
consideration in any decision.").
42. Prior to the late 1970s, the FCC aimed to restrict concentration of
ownership and maximize the number of independent voices in the media, em-
phasizing the public interest in a diverse marketplace of ideas. See supra Part
I.A-B. Since the 1980s, FCC policy has shifted to favor elimination of legal re-
strictions on concentration, and reliance on market forces or the antitrust laws
to address competitive problems. See Baker, supra note 15, at 869.
43. In the 1980s the FCC began to enact rule changes independently of
Congress under the chairmanship of Mark Fowler, a Reagan appointee. See
TILLINGHAST, supra note 31, at 86-87. Fowler undertook a systematic assault
on the existing regulatory framework, beginning in the broadcast television
arena, where the FCC expanded national limits on station ownership. See
Baker, supra note 15, at 868. In a final interview after leaving the FCC in
1987, Fowler stated that if it were possible he "would have closed the doors for
good" upon leaving the building. See TILLINGHAST, supra note 31, at 87. For a
detailed description of Fowler's regulatory philosophy, see Mark S. Fowler &
Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 207, 230-57 (1982) (proposing a market alternative to trusteeship
regulation of the broadcast industry).
44. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
45. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (describing § 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act as a "mandate"
to continue review of ownership rules in favor of deregulation).
46. The 1996 Act increased the proportion of the national television audi-
ence that could be reached by a single owner from 25% to 35%. See Telecom-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:1697
munications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to reconsider remain-
ing ownership limitations on a biennial basis to determine
whether they remain "necessary in the public interest."47 The
FCC and the D.C. Circuit have interpreted this provision to
carry a "presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the
ownership rules," rather than requiring an affirmative justifi-
cation, as required under traditional administrative law.48 The
D.C. Circuit's interpretation emboldened the FCC to actively
pursue deregulatory policy initiatives without fear of interven-
tion by Congress or the courts.4 9 Since 1996 the FCC has con-
munications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 56, 111.
The modifications to the ownership rule approved by the FCC in June 2003
further increased the audience reach limit to 45%. See 2003 Ownership Rules,
supra note 6, at 46,286. In July 2003, the House of Representatives over-
whelmingly approved a spending bill that would have prevented any changes
in the television ownership limits, but would not have impacted other aspects
of the proposed rules changes. See Christopher Stern & Jonathan Krim, House
Votes to Prevent Change in Media Rule, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at Al. On
January 22, 2004, after a "closed door bargaining session" between congres-
sional GOP leadership and White House representatives, the Senate approved
a spending package already passed by the House that provides funds to the
FCC so long as they do not prohibit common ownership by a parent company
of stations that reach up to 39% of American viewers. See Frank Ahrens, Sen-
ate Adopts TV Station Limit, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at A5. The 39% fig-
ure accommodated media giants Viacom Inc., owner of CBS, and News Corp.,
owner of Fox. Id. Both companies were in violation of a 35% ownership limit
and faced the prospect of divestiture of stations in the absence of the compro-
mise. Id.
47. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 202(h), 110
Stat. 56, 111-12.
The Commission shall review its rules adopted pursuant to this sec-
tion and all of its ownership rules biennially ... and shall determine
whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the
result of competition. The Commission shall repeal or modify any
regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.
Id.
48. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,307 ("The purpose of
the presumption is thus to shift the traditional administrative law burden
from those seeking to modify or eliminate the rule to those seeking to retain
it."); Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1044 (remanding the national televi-
sion ownership rule to the Commission); Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284
F.3d 148, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding the local television ownership rule
to the Commission).
49. In fact, both Congress and the courts have resisted the rule changes.
In September 2003, the Third Circuit placed the rules under an emergency
stay pending judicial review. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388,
2003 WL 22052896, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (per curiam). Two weeks later,
the Republican-controlled U.S. Senate passed a "resolution of disapproval" to
roll back the new rules, a rarely invoked legislative device that allows Con-
gress to overturn a federal administrative regulation. S.J. Res. 17, 108th
Cong. (2003); see Frank Ahrens, Senate Votes to Block FCC Media Rules,
1706
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ducted three biennial reviews, easing restrictions on joint own-
ership of television stations in 1999,50 and initiating proceed-
ings that resulted in the rule changes announced in June
2003.51
B. THE NEW CROSS MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULE
In June 2003 the FCC modified a series of media owner-
ship rules, including the ban on cross-ownership of newspapers
and broadcast television stations." The new Cross Media Own-
ership Rule increases the circumstances in which a company
can own television stations, radio stations, and daily newspa-
pers in a single market.53 The FCC justified the new rule on the
premise that technological innovations have resulted in a mod-
ern media landscape where evolving forms of communications,
such as the Internet, can effectively compete with traditional
media forms, such as newspapers and broadcast television.
5 4
The FCC concluded that in the highly competitive modern
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2003, at Al. The resolution of disapproval languished
in the House, see Frank Ahrens, Hill Faulted on Scrutiny of FCC Rules,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2003, at El. In January 2004, Congress passed a spend-
ing bill that compromised on the scope of the television ownership regulations,
see supra note 46. For more on opposition by Congress and the public to the
new media ownership rules, see Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols, Up in
Flames: The Public Revolts Against Monopoly Media, THE NATION, Nov. 17,
2003, at 3 (describing public opposition to media ownership restrictions). See
also Frank Ahrens, 'Soldier's Ethic' Guides Powell at the FCC; Chairman Gets
Advice from Father, the General, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at B1 (discussing
Powell's controversial chairmanship).
50. See Baker, supra note 15, at 869. It was this rule change that allowed
the merger of CBS and Viacom, announced shortly thereafter. See id. at 869
n.160.
51. It was during the 1998 Biennial Review that the FCC first considered
eliminating the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule. See id. at 869.
52. See Frank Ahrens, Panel Fires Shot Across FCC's Bow: Stevens
Amendment Maintains Cap on TV Networks' Size, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003,
at E5.
53. The previous cross-ownership rule prohibited common ownership of
daily newspapers and broadcast outlets in the same market. See Washington
Monitor, FCC Adopts New Rules That Generally Permit Companies to Own
More Media Businesses Than They Could Before, ENT. L. REP., June 2003, at
4.
54. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314 ("The Commis-
sion's analysis turns ... on the availability of other news and information out-
lets.... The average American has a far richer and more varied range of me-
dia voices from which to choose today than at any time in history."). But see
ALGER, supra note 5, at 162 (pointing out that many Web sites offer links to
information, but few involve any original reporting, which "raises questions
about how meaningful a source of news coverage the 'new media' really are").
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media market, the outright ban on cross-ownership was no
longer an essential, or justifiable, means of promoting view-
point diversity.
55
The revised cross-ownership rule opens the door for news-
paper companies to acquire television station in markets where
they already have print dailies, as long as those markets have
more than three operating television stations. 6 In markets
with four to eight television stations, companies are permitted
to own any of the following combinations: one daily newspaper,
one television station, and half the number of radio stations al-
lowable under the Local Radio Ownership Rule;57 a daily news-
paper, no television stations, and as many radio stations as are
permitted for that market; or two television stations and as
many radio stations as are permitted for the market, but no58
newspapers. In markets with nine or more television stations,
the FCC has eliminated all restrictions on cross-ownership.59
C. THE FCC's PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS
In its 2003 Final Report and Order, the FCC justified its
reversal of the cross-ownership ban based on an analysis of
studies of cross-ownership's potential effects in three areas:
competition in media markets (based on the market for adver-
tising dollars), localism in news content, and viewpoint diver-
55. 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314. The Commission
claimed it had therefore failed to meet its evidentiary burden to refute the
statutory presumption of modification or repeal in section 202(h) of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. See id. at 46,315; Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111. Based on a study of
various markets using the diversity index, the Commission concluded that
"the vast majority of local media markets are healthy, well-functioning, and
diverse." 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,321.
56. See Washington Monitor, supra note 53, at 4 (summarizing provisions
of the new Cross Media Ownership rule). But see Jonathan A. Knee, Should
We Fear Media Cross-Ownership?, REGULATION, Summer 2003, at 16 (arguing
that concerns about broadcast media conglomerates purchasing newspapers
are misplaced: "Not one of the major broadcasters has recently evinced any
interest in owning significant U.S. newspaper assets.").
57. The FCC also altered the Local Radio Ownership rule to allow owner-
ship of as many as eight radio stations in markets with forty-five or more ra-
dio stations, and five stations in markets with fourteen or fewer stations. See
Washington Monitor, supra note 53, at 4. The new rule also alters the method
for determining a "market" to consider geographic boundaries rather than sig-
nal reach. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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sity." After balancing the potential detrimental effects of cross-
ownership against the potential gains in each of these three ar-
eas, the FCC concluded that a complete ban on cross-ownership
was no longer "necessary in the public interest."
6
'
The Report and Order first considered potential effects on
competition between newspapers and broadcast television sta-
tions. The FCC looked to competition in the advertising mar-
ket, and concluded that "most advertisers do not view newspa-
pers, television stations, and radio stations as close
substitutes."2 Thus, a merger between newspapers and broad-
cast television stations would not result in any meaningful re-
duction in competition sufficient to offset the efficiencies of in-
tegration. 3 The FCC conceded that a "small group" of
advertisers may employ all three media, and could suffer com-
petitive harm in the event of a cross-media merger, but con-
cluded that the antitrust laws and other limits on station own-
ership would offer sufficient protection from monopolistic
behavior by cross-media owners.'
The Report and Order recognized the promotion of localism
as a general policy goal, and suggested that localism can be
achieved by fostering market structures that create incentives
for media companies to serve local communities.65 While the
FCC noted that newspapers and television stations continue to
be the dominant source of local news content, the Report and
60. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,312-14.
61. See id. at 46,310.
62. Id. at 46,312. The Report and Order states: "Historically the Commis-
sion has relied on assessments of competition in advertising markets as a
proxy for consumer welfare in media markets." Id. at 46,289.
63. For a discussion of the efficiencies that may result from cross-
ownership, such as the benefits of a common newsroom, see id. at 46,313.
64. See id. (stating that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission review mergers for detrimental effects in the advertising market).
In fact, evidence shows that media conglomerates such as Gannett often al-
ready have extensive market power in local advertising markets. See ALGER,
supra note 5, at 12 (describing Gannett's business practices as described in
Richard McCord's book, The Chain Gang). Alger cited a study by journalism
professor John Busterna that found that Gannett papers charged about ten
percent more than independent newspapers for equivalent advertising. Id. at
130-31. Antitrust challenges to abusive behavior by newspaper groups, such
as predatory pricing of subscriptions, have been largely unsuccessful, in part
due to special immunities such as the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970.
See Robbie Steel, Comment, Joint Operating Agreements in the Newspaper In-
dustry: A Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 275, 276
(1989).
65. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,290.
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Order claimed that the "breadth and depth" of local news cov-
erage is actually enhanced by the efficiencies that result from
common ownership, such as the sharing of newsroom resources
and staff.
66
Finally, the FCC considered potential effects on viewpoint
diversity. The Report and Order acknowledged that the pur-
pose of the original cross-ownership rule was to promote view-
point diversity, but claimed the new rule will be adequate to
preserve diversity while permitting important efficiencies thatS 67
enhance overall news quality. The FCC suggested that such
efficiencies may even lead to an increase in the number of
newspapers in some markets and "foster the development of
important new sources of local news and information."68 As evi-
dence of such efficiencies, the FCC pointed to empirical studies
of grandfathered newspaper-television combinations that illus-
trate local television news coverage superior to other network
affiliates, without displaying patterns of bias that would en-
danger viewpoint diversity. 9 The FCC concluded that its "his-
66. Id. at 46,313 (citing studies that show that newspaper-owned network
affiliates provide more local news and public affairs programs than independ-
ents, and that stations owned by newspapers in the same community provide
more public affairs programming than stations owned by newspapers outside
the community).
67. Id. ("[T]he local rules.. . herein will sufficiently protect diversity of
viewpoint while permitting efficiencies that can ultimately improve the qual-
ity and quantity of news and informational programming."). For more on the
purposes of the original cross-ownership rule, see supra Part I.B.
68. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314. Such an increase
in new competitors in the newspaper and broadcast industry seems unlikely
given the recent consolidation of the radio industry following the repeal of
ownership restrictions by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See Adam J.
van Alstyne, Note, Clear Control: An Antitrust Analysis of Clear Channel's
Radio and Concert Empire, 88 MINN. L. REV. 627, 639-42 (2004). The possibil-
ity that repeal of the rule might lead to an increase in the number of newspa-
pers in some markets also conflicts with declining trends in daily newspaper
circulation and the number of daily newspapers in general. See ALGER, supra
note 5, at 130-34.
69. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314 (citing Pritchard,
supra note 1). The results of such studies, however, have been largely incon-
clusive. For example, in Chicago, where the Tribune Company owns a local
television station and radio station, the Pritchard study found that the edito-
rial page of the Chicago Tribune was solidly pro-Bush, reflecting the viewpoint
of management, but news stories had a slight pro-Gore slant. See Pritchard,
supra note 1, at 42-44. Therefore, the study found that the Tribune
Company's viewpoints had little influence "other than on the editorial page."
Id. at 43-44. In Dallas, where the Morning News is owned by the Belo Corpo-
ration, (which also owns a local television station and three nonlocal television
stations), the study also found a decidedly pro-Bush slant on the editorial
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torical assumption that media ownership inevitably shapes the
news to suit its own interests may no longer be true (if it ever
was)."7°
While the FCC acknowledged that ownership has some in-
fluence on viewpoint, it found the evidence of such an effect in-
sufficient to mandate a "blanket prohibition" on cross-
ownership.7' According to the Report and Order, the record did
not establish the "high degree" of confidence that media outlets
of cross-media parent companies demonstrated the kind of
"uniform bias" that would be necessary to justify the rule."
While acknowledging that particular outlets may be prone to
show some bias, particularly where the interests of their parent
corporation are involved, the Report and Order claimed such
"anecdotes do not show a pattern of bias in the vast majority of
news comment and coverage where such self-interest is not im-
plicated."73
The single most important justification for the FCC's re-
peal of the cross-ownership ban was the increased availability
of other news and information outlets to make up for any losses
in viewpoint diversity that increased cross-ownership may
bring.74 The Report and Order pointed to "ample evidence that
competing media outlets abound in markets of all sizes--each
providing a platform for civic discourse."75 Traditional media
page, but noted that published letters to the editor were pro-Gore. Id. at 45-
46. In Milwaukee, where Journal Communications owns the only daily news-
paper, as well as a local television station, two radio stations, and twenty
weekly newspapers serving the suburbs, the study found that the majority of
the editorial board of the Journal Sentinel favored Gore, but others favored
Bush, leading to a stalemate and a decision to endorse neither candidate for
President. Id. at 46-47. The study noted that the material selected on the edi-
torial page of the Journal Sentinel tended to be pro-Gore, as did the daily news
coverage. Id. at 48. Coverage on the television and radio stations owned by
Journal Communications were found to be pro-Bush, see id. at 48, while radio
coverage "amounted to little more than unpaid propaganda for the Bush cam-
paign," id. at 49.
70. See Pritchard, supra note 1, at 51.
71. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314.
72. See id. But see FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775,
786 (1978) (noting that the lack of empirical evidence was not fatal to the
cross-ownership rule, and that "even a small gain in diversity" was a sufficient
justification).
73. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314.
74. See id. (stating that the FCC's determination does not hinge on theo-
retical market pressures on corporate owners to provide diverse viewpoints,
but "on the availability of other news and information outlets" to provide such
viewpoints).
75. See id. The FCC based its analysis of diversity on an index that ac-
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forms such as television, radio, and daily newspapers have
been supplemented by cable and satellite television, and the
Internet, which the FCC claims has become a "commonly-used
source for news.7 6 According to the Report and Order, the in-
flux of new media outlets ensures that "the influence of any
single viewpoint source is sharply attenuated."17 Therefore, the
FCC concluded that a complete ban on cross-ownership was no
longer in the public interest and could not be justified in the
modern media climate. 8
III. A NEW CASE FOR RETAINING THE
NEWSPAPER/BROADCAST CROSS-OWNERSHIP BAN
The FCC concluded in its 2003 Report and Order that the
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban was no longer in the
public interest based on several related factors: (1) the evidence
connecting diversity of ownership to viewpoint diversity was
unpersuasive; (2) the development of new media technologies
has resulted in greater viewpoint diversity, which makes cross-
ownership regulation unnecessary; and (3) cross-ownership
does not harm localism in the media, and may in fact enhance
local coverage.79 This section addresses each of these factors in
turn, and considers the potential effects of cross-ownership on
the democratic process, in asserting that the newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership ban remains necessary in the public
interest.
corded equal weight to all outlets within a given medium, without considering
individual market shares. See Dr. Mark Cooper, Abracadabra! Hocus-Pocus!
Making Media Market Power Disappear with the FCC's Diversity Index (Con-
sumer Fed'n of Am.), July 2003, at 5, http://www.consumersunion.org/
abrafina721.pdf. An FCC study of various markets using this diversity index
led the Commission to conclude "the vast majority of local media markets are
healthy, well-functioning and diverse." See id. at 5 n.4 (quoting 2003 Owner-
ship Rules, supra note 6, at 46,321).
76. 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314.
77. Id.
78. Id. The FCC stated that the issue was not whether a firm could domi-
nate the distribution of news in any one market, but "whether they will be
able to be heard at all among the cacophony of voices vying for the attention of
Americans." Id. The Commission claimed the perceived growth in local media
sources will ensure a "plethora of voices in most or all markets absent the
rule."Id.
79. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the FCC's rationale in the 2003 Final
Report and Order).
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A. OWNERSHIP REMAINS A RELEVANT, AND NECESSARY, PROXY
FOR VIEWPOINT
The FCC originally justified the newspaper/broadcast
cross-ownership ban on the premise that ownership is an effec-
tive, if imperfect, proxy for viewpoint. Therefore, enforced di-
versification of ownership would result in greater viewpoint di-
versity.80 The Supreme Court upheld the ban as a reasonable
means of achieving viewpoint diversity, without requiring ex-
plicit proof of anticompetitive effects from cross-ownership.8'
The Court stated that while there was no necessary connection
between ownership and viewpoint, it was unrealistic to expect
commonly owned newspapers and television stations to reflect
the same diversity of viewpoints "as if they were antagonisti-
cally run. 82 In the absence of persuasive countervailing consid-
erations, "even a small gain in diversity" was "worth pursu-
ing."
83
By removing the presumption of validity normally attrib-
uted to administrative regulations, the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 forced the FCC to reexamine media ownership
regulations on a biennial basis to determine if they remained
"necessary in the public interest."8 4 In its 2003 Report and Or-
der, the FCC interpreted this language to require evidence in
the record establishing a "high degree" of confidence that cross-
owned properties exhibited "uniform bias" in their reporting.8 5
Such an extreme evidentiary burden is a far cry from the ra-
tional relationship relied upon by the FCC in 1975, and subse-
quently affirmed by the Supreme Court in National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting.6
It is difficult to imagine a case where the record would il-
lustrate that ownership leads to a pattern of "uniform bias," be-
cause bias itself is often exerted in subtle ways, and reserved
for situations where the direct interests of ownership are at
80. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
82. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 797 (1978)
(quoting 1975 Ownership Rules, supra note 12, at 1079-80).
83. Id. at 786 (quoting 1975 Ownership Rules, supra note 12, at 1076,
1080 n.30).
84. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 202(h), 110
Stat. 56, 111-12; see also supra Part II.A.
85. 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314.
86. See supra Part I.B.
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stake. For example, would a media outlet that chooses to
forego all coverage of a corporate scandal involving its parent
corporation illustrate a pattern of uniform bias?"8 Or would
such censorship represent an isolated anecdote? What if a
newspaper decides to cover a controversial issue, but moves it
from the front page to the back of the business section? Such
editorial judgments can have an immense impact on how the
public perceives an issue, yet they are almost impossible to
measure empirically.89 By erecting a standard for itself that is
so high as to be essentially illusory, the FCC set the stage to
repeal not only the cross-ownership ban, but also all remaining
restrictions on media ownership.90
87. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 15-17 (6th ed. 2000)
(stating that media owners are more likely to influence how an issue is pre-
sented than to mandate or ban coverage of that issue); Cheryl Leanza & Har-
old Feld, More Than "a Toaster with Pictures". Defending Media Ownership
Limits, COMM. LAw, Fall 2003, at 12, 19 ("[Rlarely do corporate heads send
notices directing their staff to cover only one side of a story or omit coverage of
an issue. As with all social policy issues, the question of cause and effect is
subtle and not always easy to measure empirically."); Street Sweep, supra note
5 (stating the comments of media critic David Berkman on the direct and indi-
rect methods ownership uses to get its message across to journalists).
88. For examples of specific instances of media outlets exhibiting bias
where the interests of their parent corporations are involved, see Baker, supra
note 15, at 908-09 (describing CBS's decision to pull an episode of 60 Minutes
relating to the interests of its parent corporation); Leanza & Feld, supra note
87, at 12, 18-19 (describing examples of media owners influencing content to
target desirable age groups, protect their financial interests, or curry favor
with the government); Richard Pollack, Is GE Mightier Than the Hudson?,
THE NATION, May 28, 2001, at 11, 14 (discussing NBC's coverage, or lack
thereof, of pollution in the Hudson river by GE, its parent corporation).
89. Recent criticism of the New York Times, Washington Post, and other
newspapers for their reluctance to criticize the Bush administration's intelli-
gence prior to the invasion of Iraq shows how subtle editorial decisions can in-
fluence public discourse. See Michael Massing, Now They Tell Us, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 26, 2004, at 43-49. While articles on the front pages of the major
newspapers are "very important in shaping what other people think... [akin
to] writing ... a memo to the White House," most of the articles criticizing the
Bush administration's intelligence prior to the war were buried in the back
pages of the major newspapers. See id. at 48 (quoting Washington Post re-
porter Walter Pincus: "[The Post's editors] went through a whole phase in
which they didn't put things on the front page that would make a difference.").
90. Exactly what kind of evidence would be necessary to show the kind of
"uniform bias" the FCC refers to? Given the difficulties in measuring view-
point, could the record in even the most concentrated markets ever establish
the "high degree" of confidence the FCC finds lacking? These questions obvi-
ously cannot be answered, but serve to emphasize the differing standards re-
lied upon by the Commission in approving the cross-ownership regulation in
1975, and modifying it in 2003.
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In fact, evidence shows that ownership influences view-
point in many cases. A recent study by the Pew Research Cen-
ter found that about twenty-five percent of journalists on the
local and national level had intentionally avoided stories to
benefit the interests of their news organizations, nearly the
same percentage had softened the tone of stories to achieve the
same result, and forty-one percent had done both.9" More than a
third of those surveyed said that news topics contrary to the
ownership's financial interests often or sometimes go unre-
ported.92 A quarter of local reporters surveyed believed that
they had been told to avoid a certain story for fabricated rea-
sons, as a pretext to protect the financial interests of owner-
ship.9"
As the number of independently owned broadcast televi-
sion stations and newspapers dwindles, and existing media
owners continue to diversify and expand their holdings, the po-
tential for conflicts of interest between ownership and editorial
staffs increases. It is almost a truism that large corporations
will tend to hold political views that favor their own self-
interest, and the interests of their shareholders. 9 Even if own-
ership has only a minimal impact on viewpoint, and this impact
only presents itself in rare cases, the implications of such a uni-
formity of viewpoint among media owners are troubling. En-
forced diversification of ownership is the only reliable means to
ensure that when conflicts do arise, other media outlets are
available to expose them.99
The FCC has a statutory mandate to protect the public in-
terest in viewpoint diversity, based on the acknowledged goal of
preserving the "widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources."96 The FCC has histori-
cally relied upon the rational connection between ownership
and viewpoint to justify media ownership regulation, as the
best available means of protecting competition in the market-
91. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Self-Censorship:
How Often and Why (Apr. 30, 2000), http://people-press.org/reports/
display.php3?ReportID=39.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1996) (tracing the po-
litical origins of American corporate governance structures).
95. See Leanza & Feld, supra note 87, at 20-21. For more on the anti-
democratic dangers of concentrated media ownership, see infra Part III.D.
96. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
20041 1715
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:1697
place of ideas.97 By refusing to recognize ownership as a legiti-
mate if imperfect proxy for viewpoint, the FCC has effectively
eliminated the only viable regulatory method of preserving
viewpoint diversity, leaving the public interest at the mercy of
the open market and the antitrust laws. 9"
B. NEW MEDIA FORMS HAVE A LIMITED IMPACT ON VIEWPOINT
DIVERSITY
The FCC's 2003 Report and Order claims that the cross-
ownership ban is no longer necessary, primarily because the
development of new media technologies has greatly increased
competition in the marketplace of ideas.99 The question is no
longer whether a firm may dominate a particular market, ac-
cording to the FCC, but whether a firm "will be able to be heard
at all among the cacophony of voices vying for the attention of
Americans."'00
By relying on new media sources such as the Internet to
preserve competition in the marketplace of ideas absent tradi-
tional ownership regulation, the FCC fails to make the crucial
distinction between source and viewpoint.'0 ' While the Internet
offers a plethora of information from an essentially limitless
number of sources, most of the news sources on the Web pro-
vide little or no original reporting.10 2 A chorus of information
sources singing the same note does not provide diversity in the
marketplace of ideas, but only serves to clutter the debate.'0 3 By
97. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
98. See Leanza & Feld, supra note 87, at 12 (arguing that ownership rules
are essential given the lack of effective alternatives short of explicit content
mandates or access rules). For a discussion of the trend in FCC policy toward
making the media more responsive to commodities markets, see generally
Baker, supra note 15.
99. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
100. 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,314.
101. See supra notes 74-75 (quoting FCC references that equated an in-
crease in "informational outlets" and "voices" to an increase in viewpoints).
Ironically, while the FCC refuses to equate ownership with viewpoint in the
absence of hard evidence, it does not hesitate to assume that new media
sources represent new viewpoints, a questionable assertion.
102. See ALGER, supra note 5, at 162 (describing the lack of original report-
ing on the Internet); see also Thane Peterson, Moveable Feast: Stop the FCC's
Covert Operation, BUS. WK. ONLINE, May 30, 2003 ("[M]ost actual news gath-
ering is still done by print organizations such as newspapers, news agencies
like the Associated Press and Bloomberg, and news magazines like Busi-
nessWeek."), at http://www.businessweek.com:/print/bwdaily/dnflash/may2003/
nf20030530 8491_db028.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
103. See 149 CONG. REC. S11,507 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003) (statement of
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analogy, imagine if the Senate was suddenly doubled or tripled
in number, but each of the new members voted in accordance
with a specified incumbent-would our democracy be any
richer?
1 4
In the television arena, the development of cable and satel-
lite technologies has significantly increased viewing options
over the last few decades, but the FCC overstates the impact of
such technologies on viewpoint diversity. The consolidating
trends in the newspaper, radio, and broadcast television mar-
kets have also reached cable and satellite television, where the
majority of channels are owned by the same handful of massive
media corporations."" It is important again to distinguish be-
tween programming sources and viewpoint. Given that owner-
ship has the power to influence viewpoint, and exercises that
power in at least some cases, it is unrealistic to assume in-
creases in media sources and programming variety provided by
the same handful of owners will provide meaningful new com-
petition within the marketplace of ideas.
The FCC studies of diversity in local media markets over-
emphasize the influence of new media technologies in conclud-
ing "that the vast majority of local media markets are healthy,
well-functioning, and diverse."0 7 In formulating its diversity
index, the FCC fails to take into account actual market shares,
thereby giving equal weight to media outlets that have vastly
different impacts on local discourse. 108 An Internet Web site or
cable television channel cannot compete on an equal footing
with a local broadcast television station or a dominant daily
newspaper, especially when that Web site or channel offers lit-
Sen. Snowe) ("While more mouths speaking is good, having more mouthpieces
guarantees neither diversity of opinion nor information. The point is the
amalgamation of control in media outlets.").
104. To further the analogy, would such an increase in individual senators
make it unnecessary to retain limits on the number of senators representing
each state?
105. See supra note 13 (citing statistics reflecting ownership trends over
the last twenty years).
106. See supra note 88 (citing examples of media outlets exhibiting bias
where the interests of their parent corporations are involved); see also 149
CONG. REC. S11,512 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cantwell)
("While I firmly believe that we are only at the cusp of an information age that
will drastically change how we receive information, it makes no difference if
the access points are controlled by fewer people.").
107. See 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,321.
108. See Cooper, supra note 75, at 7-9 (analyzing flaws in the FCC's diver-
sity index).
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tle original reporting. In fact, many critics have questioned
whether the Internet has any impact at all on local civic dis-
course,109 yet the emergence of new media forms is the single
most important justification for the FCC's decision to modify
the cross-ownership rule."'
In 1975 the FCC stated that "even a small gain in diver-
sity" was worth pursuing in accordance with its First Amend-
ment goal of "'the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources.'""' Unless ownership
and viewpoint are entirely unrelated, ownership restrictions
necessarily result in at least small gains in viewpoint diversity,
and should therefore be retained. While important new sources
of information have developed over the last three decades, the
ultimate control of such sources is in fewer and less diverse
hands-those of a handful of corporate CEOs."' The FCC must
retain restrictions on media cross-ownership to ensure that
these new technologies become a vehicle for new and diverse
voices, rather than a mere conduit for existing ones.
C. CROSS-OWNERSHIP AND LOCALISM
The FCC, in its 2003 Report and Order, claims that cross-
ownership increases the amount of local news content provided
by media outlets, citing studies comparing network affiliates
owned by newspapers within the same community to affiliates
owned by newspapers outside the community."13 Because the
affiliates owned by newspapers in the same community tended
to provide more public affairs programming, the FCC concluded
that cross-ownership results in efficiencies that increase the
"breadth and depth" of local news coverage; therefore, the
cross-ownership ban Was unnecessary to protect localism.'
While broadcast affiliates and newspapers in the same
community may benefit substantially from pooling their re-
109. See ALGER, supra note 5, at 222 (discussing the limited effectiveness
of the Internet as a substitute for the mainstream mass media in fostering
civic discourse within communities); Leanza & Feld, supra note 87, at 18
(pointing out that "even supporters of deregulation agree" that cable networks
and the Internet are ineffective in providing local news).
110. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
111. 1975 Ownership Rules, supra note 12, at 1048, 1080 n.30 (emphasis
added) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
112. See supra note 13.
113. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
114. 2003 Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 46,313.
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sources, the benefits are unlikely to accrue in both directions.
For example, if a cross-owned newspaper and television station
decide to adopt a common newsroom and streamline their re-
porting staff, the television station may benefit from more in-
depth reporting, while the newspaper suffers from increased
demands on its reporting staff. The other drawback of cross-
media mergers is the loss of an independent news provider in
the local market, which has a negative impact on viewpoint di-
versity." 5
Ironically, by extolling the benefits of newspaper and tele-
vision station synergy, the FCC acknowledges that homogene-
ity of content and viewpoint are likely to result, reinforcing the
argument that common ownership results in an overall de-
crease in viewpoint diversity.1 16 Localism is an important virtue
when it serves to better inform citizens about events and issues
in their communities, but to be truly informed, citizens must be
exposed to diverse viewpoints about local issues from a variety
of independent sources." ' Localism without viewpoint diversity
is an empty value, and is not a persuasive justification for
modifying restrictions on cross-ownership.
D. ANTIDEMOCRATIC DANGERS OF MEDIA CROSS-OWNERSHIP
The FCC's 2003 modifications to the media ownership
rules did not come out of the blue. For years, the companies
that own the media have vigorously lobbied the FCC to repeal
regulations such as the cross-ownership ban to allow them to
acquire additional media outlets and become even larger."'
115. See Peterson, supra note 102 ("The 'efficiencies' that come with merg-
ers will likely mean fewer reporters, less local news, and a diminishing of the
debate democracy needs to function.").
116. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
117. See 149 CONG. REC. S11,512 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Cantwell) (Arguing that removing the cross-ownership ban "reduces the
number of voices in individual markets and threatens to place too much con-
trol over local news and information in the hands of too few companies. Re-
packing and repeating stories produced in other venues is not the same as real
reporting of local news.").
118. See THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY
OF COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 134-36 (1996) (de-
scribing the historical role of lawyers and lobbyists in formulating FCC poli-
cies); Bob Williams, Behind Closed Doors: Top Broadcasters Met 71 Times with
FCC Officials, THE PUBLIC I, May 29, 2003 (describing private, closed-door ses-
sions between broadcasters and the FCC's five commissioners and their top
advisors prior to the June 2003 vote on the relaxation of media ownership
rules), at http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportlD=526 (last
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Over the last two decades, the number of entities controlling
the majority of American media outlets has declined from more
than fifty to only six."9 In the world of antitrust law, such an
oligopoly is considered dangerous because it may facilitate col-
lusion between its members, and thereby threaten competi-
tion.120 While collusion may lead to price-fixing in the market
for peanuts or potatoes, its implications for the mass media
market, and the marketplace of ideas, are far more profound. 2'
Policy issues that news organizations choose to ignore tend
to escape public discussion, and are often decided by politicians,
and the powerful special interests that influence them."' The
massive corporations that own the media are among these spe-
cial interests, and together possess the power to dictate, or
limit, public discourse. It is perhaps these instances of self-
censorship that pose the biggest threat to an informed democ-
racy by removing important issues from the public eye.2 2 For
example, a corporation involved in a lawsuit would often prefer
no coverage at all to even favorable coverage by the news me-
dia.26 The ability to silence the media is as powerful as the abil-
ity to influence its content, and must be taken into account in
measuring viewpoint diversity.
visited Apr. 25, 2004). The media's lobbying efforts have not only been directed
at the FCC, but have also extended to political candidates. See Leanza & Feld,
supra note 87, at 20 (describing an ultimatum by several Iowa television sta-
tions encouraging candidate Bob Dole to change his stance on a critical media
issue on the eve of the Iowa caucus).
119. See supra note 13.
120. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
122. See ALGER, supra note 5, at 21. Dean Alger notes that
if a policy issue is not broadly covered by the main newspapers and
news shows and widely discussed in the public arena, it is likely that
the scope of societal conflict about the issue will be rather narrow and
only governmental insiders and ... special interests will be effectively
involved in the debate over what policy option to choose--or not to
choose.
Id.
123. See supra note 118 (describing the historical lobbying power of news
organizations).
124. See Leanza & Feld, supra note 87, at 20 (noting owners' prerogative to
promote or remain silent on political issues). For a notable example of media
silence, one need only look at the major media's failure to cover the FCC's
hearings leading up to the 2003 media ownership rules changes. See Dante
Chinni, Editorial, Media Drop the Ball on FCC Rules Changes, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 10, 2003, at 11.
125. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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For example, an editorial staff that favors one candidate
but chooses to forego an endorsement to avoid displeasing
management is reflecting the biases of the newspaper's own-
ers.16 A choice not to endorse a candidate is equivalent to a de-
cision not to publish a story-both remove a viewpoint that
would otherwise have become part of the civic discourse. An
endorsement of the presidential candidate is perhaps the most
direct and important statement of viewpoint a newspaper can
make. Yet the failure to make such an endorsement might not
be considered relevant to a study analyzing the effect of owner-
ship concentration on viewpoint diversity. 127
The First Amendment accords constitutional protection to
the press as an important check on government power. But the
press is only an effective check to the extent that it remains in-
dependent and diverse. 28 As soon as the press ceases to reflect
the diversity of viewpoints of the populace, the populace loses
its ability to make informed decisions in exercising its democ-
ratic rights. By relaxing the ban on cross-ownership, the FCC
will allow existing media conglomerates to acquire even more
media outlets, and increase the danger that such corporations
will use their media holdings to further their own political ob-
jectives, without being held accountable by their peers.
IV. ANTITRUST LAW AND
NEWSPAPER/BROADCAST MERGERS
If restrictions on cross-ownership are abandoned, natural
market forces and the antitrust laws will be the only remaining
restraints on newspaper/broadcast mergers. Because newspa-
pers and television stations exist in different submarkets, and
can achieve significant efficiencies through merger, antitrust
law provides little or no resistance to newspaper/broadcast
mergers. Current antitrust law, which focuses almost exclu-
sively on the economic effects of a merger or restraint, does not
adequately take into account noneconomic policy concerns such
as viewpoint diversity, and is therefore a poor surrogate for
cross-ownership regulation by the FCC.
126. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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A. SIMPLE ECONOMICS: ANTITRUST LAW SINCE THE 1970S
The shift in the late 1970s and early 1980s toward a
market-based regulatory policy at the FCC was mirrored in the
antitrust arena, where the courts began to rely almost entirely
on economic factors in analyzing competitive effects. 129 The Chi-
cago School of antitrust, led by Robert Bork, began to push for a
more coherent antitrust policy based on maximizing consumer
welfare through economic efficiency." 0 According to the Chicago
School, traditional noneconomic concerns, such as protecting
small businesses, had muddled the antitrust analysis and were
no longer necessary. 3 1 As long as competition existed, wide dis-
persal of ownership was unimportant. 3 2 The essential question,
and really the only question, was whether the merger or re-
straint had a positive or negative impact on economic
efficiency.'33
129. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (refusing to
weigh the interests of small businesses in applying the rule of reason under
the Clayton Act); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979) (applying the rule of reason and upholding the use of a joint sales agent
to negotiate blanket licensing of copyrighted music, based on the benefits of
integration and reduced transaction costs that outweigh competitive harms);
Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (holding that
a ban on competitive bidding among engineers could not be justified by public
interest justifications such as quality or safety, and confining application of
the rule of reason to an assessment of economic effects to determine net com-
petitive consequences); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (applying the rule of reason to measure the economic effects of in-
trabrand vertical restraints). But see Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982) (finding that a maximum price-fixing scheme among doc-
tors was per se unlawful despite asserted procompetitive benefits); United
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering noneconomic fac-
tors such as the importance of higher education in applying the rule of reason
to an alleged price-fixing scheme between Ivy League universities).
130. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
ITSELF 6-11 (1978).
131. See id. at 7.
132. See id. at 7-8 ("Business efficiency necessarily benefits consumers by
lowering the costs of goods and services or by increasing the value of the prod-
uct or service offered; this is true whether the business unit is a competitor or
a monopolist.").
133. Economic efficiency under the Chicago School model consists of two
related but separate factors: productive efficiency and allocative efficiency. See
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213,
226 (1985). Productive efficiency involves the company's ability to produce a
product at the lowest possible cost, for example, by taking advantage of
economies of scale. See id. Allocative efficiency relates to the distribution of
resources between the company and the consumer. BORK, supra note 130, at
1722
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In 1977 the Supreme Court announced its decision in Con-
tinental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, adopting a purely economic
analysis to uphold territorial restraints imposed by a television
manufacturer on its retail franchisees.14 A year later, in Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,'135 the
Court struck down a ban on competitive bidding between engi-
neers, confining its analysis to whether the challenged restric-
tion promoted or restrained competition. 136 The implication was
clear-there was no longer room for social or political concerns
in the rule of reason, which had become a test of economic effi-
ciency based on market factors alone.'37
While developments in Supreme Court case law have made
it harder to challenge conduct by existing firms, revisions to the
Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines have made it easier
for firms to merge or acquire one another, even in concentrated
markets. Under the current Merger Guidelines, the first step
91-104. For example, a company that expands capacity to improve productive
efficiency may simultaneously harm allocative efficiency if it charges monop-
oly prices. Id. at 98-101. The goal of the Chicago School model is to maximize
the overall net efficiency gains, without regard for how such gains are distrib-
uted. Hovenkamp, supra, at 226; see also Baker, supra note 15, at 870 (dis-
cussing the maintenance of competition as the "only important policy concern"
of current antitrust policy, and the lack of emphasis on dispersal of ownership
in the absence of a monopoly situation). For a more thorough discussion of the
evolution of antitrust theory from the Sherman Act to the Chicago School, see
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (5th ed. 2003).
134. 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977). For a discussion of the Sylvania case in the
context of the rise of the Chicago School, see Hovenkamp, supra note 133, at
259-60.
135. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
136. See id. at 688 (stating that the rule of reason "focuses directly on the
challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions").
137. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 4.08 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing
the impact of Professional Engineers on the rule of reason analysis). Since the
late 1970s, traditional noneconomic policy concerns-such as distribution of
wealth, protection of small businesses, and the antidemocratic dangers of
market concentration-have been largely absent from the Supreme Court's
antitrust analysis. See Baker, supra note 15, at 870 n.163 (noting that such
principles are still referred to, but usually only as an afterthought). Subse-
quent cases have solidified the economic approach to the rule of reason analy-
sis, balancing restraints on competition against offsetting economic efficien-
cies. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
138. Section 7 of the Clayton Act bars mergers and acquisitions if the effect
of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." 15 U.S.C. §18 (2000). The Department of Justice has jurisdiction to
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in analyzing a merger or acquisition is to define the relevant
market or submarket." 9 The relevant market determines
whether the merging firms are horizontal competitors. Hori-
zontal mergers are acceptable as long as the resulting firm will
not have the capacity to exercise market power, either on its
own or as part of an oligopoly. 140 If the firms inhabit different
markets, the merger is considered a vertical or conglomerate
merger, and is assessed under a more lenient standard.
1 4
'
Even if anticompetitive conditions are present, a merger
may be approved if the net impact is procompetitive. 142 While
the original Merger Guidelines did not recognize business effi-
ciencies as a valid defense, 143 the 1992 Guidelines emphasize
that the "primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their ef-
ficiency-enhancing potential, which can increase the competi-
tiveness of firms and result in lower prices to consumers."44
decide which mergers to challenge on a case-by-case basis by applying princi-
ples defined in its Merger Guidelines. See Reid B. Horwitz, Media Ownership
Rules, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 2002, at B10. The FCC also has authority under the
Communications Act of 1934 to disapprove mergers that it deems contrary to
the public interest, but has seldom used its authority to alter transactions
once they have been approved by the Department of Justice. Id. While the
Merger Guidelines were not enacted by statute or formal rule making proce-
dures, they continue to influence the courts in their application of the anti-
trust laws. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 137, § 7.09.
139. See Horwitz, supra note 138, at B10.
140. Id. Market power is defined as the ability to raise price or reduce out-
put below competitive levels. Id. For a more thorough discussion of market
power as defined by the Merger Guidelines, see SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra
note 137, § 7.09.
141. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 137, § 7.03(A). A vertical
merger occurs when one firm merges with either its customer or supplier. Id.
Such mergers theoretically leave competition in each market unchanged, but
may have the effect of creating barriers to entry or facilitating collusion be-
tween firms. Id. Conglomerate mergers occur between firms that have no prior
relationship and exist in different markets. Id. § 7.03(B). Such mergers are
only challenged if they occur in concentrated markets, where they may result
in entrenchment of a powerful firm that further discourages entry, or facilitate
reciprocity between the merging entities that forecloses other buyers and sell-
ers from a substantial share of the market. Id.
142. See id. § 7.03. Courts determine the net impact by weighing the bene-
fits or efficiencies that might result from the merger against any potential for
anticompetitive harm. See Horwitz, supra note 138, at B10.
143. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 137, § 7.09(C)(1)(b) (describing
the increasing relevance of efficiencies as a defense in merger cases, as re-
flected by specific changes in the 1982, 1984, and 1992 versions of the Merger
Guidelines).
144. Id. (quoting § 4.4 of the 1992 Merger Guidelines). In 1997, the De-
partment of Justice and the FTC revised section 4 again, specifying that only
"merger specific efficiencies"-those that could not be achieved without
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Thus, mergers that may have been disqualified in the past due
to the high market shares or other factors may be permissible
today, as long as economic efficiencies are likely to result. 145
B. NEWSPAPER/BROADCAST MERGERS
Given the trend toward concentration and vertical integra-
tion in the media industry, it is likely that relaxation of the
cross-ownership ban will encourage further mergers between
newspapers and broadcast television stations in the same
communities, and the expansion of existing newspaper groups
146into new media venues. Because newspapers and television
stations exist in different advertising submarkets for antitrust
purposes, and can achieve significant efficiencies in news gath-
ering and distribution through merger, courts are unlikely to
prevent newspaper and television station mergers under cur-
rent law.'
4 1
1. Newspapers as Natural Monopolies
As early as 1953, the Supreme Court conceded that compe-
tition among daily newspapers in most markets was no longer a
realistic possibility.4 8 By 1980, almost ninety-eight percent of
American communities were served by a single daily newspa-
per. 49 The unique structural characteristics of the newspaper
industry explain the tendency for dailies to monopolize. These
characteristics include economies of scale, the unavailability
merger-should be considered by the government in its preliminary review.
Id.
145. Under the original 1968 Guidelines, market share of the merging
firms was a critical element in determining whether to challenge a merger un-
der Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. § 7.09. Unless no barriers to entry were
present, the Department would challenge mergers in which the acquiring firm
had a ten percent market share, and the acquired firm's market share ex-
ceeded six percent. Id. § 7.09(C)(2)(b). The 1968 Guidelines reflected the tradi-
tional concerns with industrial concentration and barriers to entry that char-
acterized the Warren Court. Id. § 7.09. Today, the focus has shifted from
market concentration to efficiency-enhancing potential. See supra notes 143-
44 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
147. See S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM & CARRINGTON SHIELDS,
NEWSPAPERS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 11 (1981).
148. See id. at 2 (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 603 (1953)).
149. Id. at 3.
150. See Baker, supra note 15, at 878-82 (discussing the potential for mo-
nopoly profits by daily newspapers and its relation to structural characteris-
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of exact substitutes for daily newspapers,15' and the mutual de-
pendency between circulation levels and advertising rates that
creates a "downward spiral" for failing competitors. 52
Like a telephone company or an electrical utility, newspa-
pers face high initial costs followed by decreasing average costs
over the supply curve.'53 Once an editorial staff has been hired,
the first issue has been written, and the press is set in motion,
the marginal cost of printing an additional copy is minimal.
15 4
Economies of scale do not always lead to monopoly, but may
create barriers to entry once a monopolist has asserted con-
trol.'55 This is especially true in the newspaper industry, where
market share (circulation) is directly related to advertising
revenue, and a decline in one tends to affect the other, creating
a downward spiral.
156
Because daily newspapers tend toward natural monopoly,
maximizing efficiencies as market share increases, the anti-
trust laws do not prevent mergers within newspaper
submarkets. 157 Entry of daily newspapers into markets domi-
nated by a monopolist is therefore rare, and usually results in
merger or failure.' Group acquisitions of existing monopolists
are more common, and are assessed for antitrust purposes in
relation to the relevant submarket, without reference to na-
tional ownership share.' Therefore, newspaper groups such as
tics of the industry, such as "high first copy costs").
151. See Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (ruling
that daily newspapers represented their own submarket distinct from that of
broadcast media, because of a range of unique uses for which the two were im-
perfect substitutes).
152. OPPENHEIM & SHIELDS, supra note 147, at 193 (discussing the
"downward spiral" as a partial justification for the Newspaper Preservation
Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (2000)).
153. See Baker, supra note 15, at 878. For a more complete discussion of
the attributes of a natural monopoly, including economies of scale, see
SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 137, § 2.04.
154. See Baker, supra note 15, at 878 (stating that additional copies have
"a low to zero cost").
155. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 137, § 2.04.
156. The "downward spiral" results from the snowball effect of "declining
circulation and diminishing advertising revenue" that emphasizes competitive
disadvantages in contested newspaper markets. Steel, supra note 64, at 278.
157. In situations where natural monopolies are present, the courts have
traditionally conceded the market to a single firm or entity, while policing that
firm's conduct to prevent abuses of market power. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON,
supra note 137, § 2.04.
158. See OPPENHEIM & SHIELDS, supra note 147, at 193.
159. See id. at 232 (noting "there is no national, or even regional, market in
1726 [Vol 88:1697
MEDIA CROSS-OWNERSHIP BAN
Gannett are free to purchase daily newspaper monopolies in
various submarkets without offending the Merger Guidelines or
the Clayton Act. 6 '
2. Newspaper and Television Station Submarkets
The unique package of services a daily newspaper repre-
sents, both for its audience and its advertisers, has tradition-
ally led the Supreme Court to consider daily newspapers as
their own submarket for the purposes of an antitrust analy-
sis.' The nonsubstitutability between daily newspapers and
other media forms makes demand for advertising relatively ine-
lastic, allowing dominant newspapers to raise rates to su-
percompetitive levels.' Audience demand is also inelastic, al-
lowing the monopolist to raise prices, or, perhaps more
importantly, indulge content or viewpoint choices that the
market would not otherwise support.'63
Newspapers and television stations, despite some overlap
among advertisers, also exist in different submarkets for anti-
trust purposes.'64 Since the two media forms are not considered
competitors for advertising purposes, newspaper-television
mergers will fall outside the Merger Guidelines for horizontal
mergers. 6 ' Even if a plaintiff can show that a merger will pro-
duce secondary anticompetitive effects, such as increased bar-
riers to entry or foreclosure of competition, the potential effi-
ciencies from cross-ownership are likely to prevail in most
which the multiple acquitisions of a newspaper group may be challenged").
160. See Steel, supra note 64, at 290-91 (discussing the role of the News-
paper Preservation Act of 1970 in increasing the dominance of newspaper
chains, and the corresponding adverse effects on editorial diversity).
161. See Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Times
Mirror Co. v. United States, 390 U.S. 712 (1968) (per curiam). For discussion
of daily newspapers as a relevant submarket for antitrust purposes, see
OPPENHEIM & SHIELDS, supra note 147, at 6-12.
162. See ALGER, supra note 5, at 130-31 (citing a study showing that Gan-
nett had power to raise prices in the advertising market above those charged
by independent publishers).
163. It is precisely this potential for a media monopolist to use su-
percompetitive profits to subsidize their own ideologies that justifies correlat-
ing ownership with viewpoint. See Baker, supra note 15, at 881-83.
164. See Citizen Publ'g Co., 394 U.S. at 131; see also Dan Levine, Bad to
Worse: FCC Approves Even More Media Consolidation, IN THESE TIMES, July
7, 2003, at 5 ("[If the defined market is newspapers, other properties like TV
stations would be irrelevant in proving illegal market fixing.").
165. See supra Part IV.A.
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antitrust challenges to cross-media mergers. 6' Therefore, re-
peal of the cross-ownership ban will allow many of the larger
newspaper groups to purchase television stations in cities
where they already enjoy newspaper monopolies, furthering the
trend toward concentration of media ownership.
C. VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Since newspaper and television station mergers are
unlikely to create directly cognizable economic harms, antitrust
law will only limit such mergers to the extent that noneconomic
factors, such as viewpoint diversity, are taken into account by
the Department of Justice and the courts.'67 Given current
trends in antitrust law, it is unlikely that impacts on viewpoint
diversity, no matter how drastic, will be sufficient to prevent
newspaper and television station mergers in the absence of a
cross-ownership ban.
168
The proponents of the Chicago School of antitrust were
concerned that the courts were applying the antitrust laws in-
consistently and arbitrarily, using public policy concerns to jus-
tify favoring their personal political objectives.'69 The Supreme
Court addressed this concern in Sylvania and Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting, Inc. ,170 by excluding traditional
noneconomic concerns from the rule of reason analysis, focusing
exclusively on economic factors.'' Current case law suggests
that the antitrust laws should be restricted in their application
to situations where economic harm, or the likelihood of such
harm, can be affirmatively demonstrated. 2 Antitrust law
therefore only prevents reductions in viewpoint diversity when
such reductions coincide with the market power necessary for
166. See supra Part IV.A.
167. See supra Part IV.A.
168. See supra Part IV.A (describing trends in antitrust law since the
1970s).
169. See supra Part IV.A.1.
170. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
171. See supra Part IV.A.
172. See supra Part IV.A. But see United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658
(3d Cir. 1993) (considering noneconomic factors in applying the rule of reason
to an alleged price-fixing scheme). While some theorists have suggested that
antitrust law should incorporate concerns about the marketplace of ideas in
analyzing the effect of media mergers, the predominant approach is limited to
considering economic factors to determine net competitive effect. See, e.g.,
Stucke & Grunes, supra note 20, passim (proposing marketplace of ideas ap-
proach).
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monopolistic pricing, or are likely to result in anticompetitive
or oligopolistic conduct within a relevant market.1
3
Antitrust scrutiny of media mergers or media firms' con-
duct focuses on potential impacts in advertising markets. 74 The
correlation between competition in advertising markets and di-
versity of media content is at best a loose one. For example,
newspapers, television stations, and radio stations in the same
geographic market can theoretically provide identical content
without offending the antitrust laws, as long as they remain
competitors in the local advertising market.7 7 Therefore, dan-
gers to viewpoint diversity are essentially immune from anti-
trust challenge unless they happen to coincide with anticom-
petitive harm in the advertising market, or the potential for
such harm.
By suggesting that antitrust enforcement can provide a
meaningful alternative to structural regulation of media own-
ership, the FCC implies that the goals and potential impacts of
each form of government intervention coincide. In fact, the
goals behind media ownership regulation are fundamentally
different from the purposes of the antitrust laws as currently
-- 176
interpreted by the courts. 'While viewpoint diversity was the
primary impetus for the original cross-ownership rule, it is at
best a minor consideration under the antitrust laws, which fo-
•. . 177
cus primarily on protecting economic competition. Therefore,
it is unrealistic for the FCC to expect the antitrust laws to pre-
serve viewpoint diversity in the absence of media ownership
regulations such as the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership
ban. Until antitrust law evolves to take into account competi-
tion in the marketplace of ideas, structural regulation of media
ownership will remain necessary to protect viewpoint diversity
and democratic discourse.
CONCLUSION
The FCC is charged with protecting the public interest in
"the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources," a principle derived from the First
173. See supra Part IV.A.
174. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
176. See supra Part I.B.
177. See supra Part III.A.
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Amendment concept of the marketplace of ideas. 178 Since the
1970s the FCC has considered this goal sufficient to justify
regulation of media ownership, without requiring explicit evi-
dence of competitive harms. Only in 1996, with the passage of
the Telecommunications Act, did the FCC begin to reconsider
ownership regulations under a heightened evidentiary stan-
dard, to determine if they remained necessary in the public in-
terest.
In June 2003, the FCC concluded that the newspa-
per/broadcast cross-ownership ban could no longer be justified
in the modern media climate. While circumstances have
changed since adoption of the cross-ownership ban in 1975, the
FCC vastly overstates these changes. New media forms provide
meaningful sources of information, but do not necessarily in-
crease diversity of viewpoints, and have not been proven effec-
tive in fostering local discourse. Repeal of the cross-ownership
ban will likely result in further concentration of newspaper and
broadcast ownership, and increase the potential for antidemo-
cratic abuses by mass media corporations.
Antitrust law, as currently interpreted, focuses almost ex-
clusively on economic factors. In the context of the media, the
Department of Justice looks to the advertising market to assess
competitive effects. Since television stations and newspapers
exist in separate advertising markets, repeal of the cross-
ownership ban will allow newspaper groups to purchase televi-
sion stations in markets where they already enjoy natural
newspaper monopolies without offending the antitrust laws.
Antitrust law is therefore a poor substitute for proactive regu-
lation by the FCC. The newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership
ban remains necessary in the public interest, to ensure that the
marketplace of ideas is accessible to more than a powerful few.
178. 1975 Ownership Rules, supra note 12, at 1048 (quoting Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
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